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**1978/05/15**

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INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

'SECDEF HAS SELIA

15 MAY 1978

5/15  
HMB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Brzezinski's Trip to China -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The following is a checklist of issues to be covered in discussion with the President on ZB's trip to China as well as recommended positions to take on the issues.

ISSUES THAT REQUIRE PRESIDENTIAL GUIDANCE

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- Timing and Approach

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EXCISED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 5USC552  
(b) (1) + (5) 94-F-0645

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ISSUES FOR WHICH PRESIDENTIAL GUIDANCE IS DESIRABLE

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ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST NORMALIZATION NOW

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David S. McEliff

David E. McEliff  
 Assistant Secretary of Defense  
 International Security Affairs

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Final Draft (5/5/78)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Cyrus Vance  
Harold Brown  
Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Subject: Normalizing US-China Relations

ISSUE

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RTB

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NORMALIZATION TERMS

To establish diplomatic relations with Peking, we will have to close down our official representation on Taiwan, terminate the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, and withdraw our remaining military personnel and installations

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BASIC SCENARIO

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- 3 -

-- make a unilateral statement indicating <sup>the importance of</sup> [ ]  
[ ] a peaceful settlement of the  
Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves [ ]

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[ ] [ ]  
-- issue a joint communique establishing diplo-  
matic relations, in which we would recognize the PRC as  
the sole legal government of China;

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Supplemental Measures

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Decision Points

Timing Factors

to move rapidly p. 207 Brez.

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Obviously, the SALT talks should continue to move forward at their own pace.

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Positive Climate with China

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. In addition, by expanding both official and unofficial contacts with the United States, resuming grain purchases for the first time since 1974, responding to our overtures on long-standing cases involving American relatives and citizens in China, and adopting a more accommodating attitude toward our mission in Peking, the Chinese have helped create the most positive climate in US-PRC relations since the establish-

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ment of Liaison Offices in 1973.

Relevance to our Asian Policy

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DOCUMENT RESPONSIVE TO 94-F-0645.

Due to the classification of contents

Pages 10 - 18

of the document Entitled

"Final Draft (5/5/78) MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT"

have been withheld in total



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CONCLUSION:

It would be useful to have your guidance prior to Zbig's trip to Peking so that he could signal the Chinese the direction in which we are likely to

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move. As you know, [

OPTIONS

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Sub-options

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3. Other \_\_\_\_\_